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Corinne Mulley* 
 
The development of the railway system transformed travel opportunities for people in the 
nineteenth century. The technological change dominating personal travel in the twentieth 
century was the development of the internal combustion engine bringing first the private 
car and then the motor bus. The early twentieth century brought a tension between these 
two modes in an environment where the UK railways were highly regulated whereas the 
upsurge of motor traffic was in contrast unregulated. Importantly too, the capital structure 
of the two modes was quite different. The railways required significant investment, funded 
by private capital whereas the motor industry, as it became technically efficient, was within 
the means of individual entrepreneurs. 
This paper looks at the way in which transport policy sought to resolve this tension 
by the proposition of legislation to promote co-ordination and integration. Initially the 
approach to ‘transport problem’ was on a mode by mode basis (railways and then motor 
buses) but after World War II, nationalisation tried to consider a more holistic approach. 
The paper identifies the way in which the UK appears to have developed differently from its 
European neighbours and identifies as a critical point that UK policy was always clouded 
by a discussion of ownership and the role that this played in the ability to ‘co-ordinate’ or 
‘integrate’ transport services. 
 
 
Railways and their impact on the means of travel dominated especially the late nineteenth 
century. Their development was technologically driven and their success came from the 
way in which they outstripped particularly the slower means of transport. Another 
technological development, the creation of the internal combustion engine, brought the 
advent of the motor vehicle era, first in the form of the car and then for the public passenger 
carrying vehicle and the transport of goods. 
The early twentieth century brought a tension between these two modes in an 
environment where the UK railways were highly regulated both on safety grounds and 
restricted in the rates or charges they could make. The upsurge of motor traffic was in 
contrast unregulated. Importantly too, the capital structure of the two modes was quite 
different. The railways required significant investment, funded by private capital whereas 
the motor industry, as it became technically efficient, was within the means of individual 
entrepreneurs. 
This tension may have been resolved differently if political events, notably World 
War I had not intervened. The use of the railways during the hostilities left the UK 
Government with its first major ‘transport problem’ of the twentieth century. The political 
ideology of the time was not in favour of state ownership, although this was considered, 
and the resolution of the railway ‘problem’ whilst the assets were still in private hands gave 
rise to a powerful lobby. 
Whilst the railway ‘problem’ was being resolved, the motor bus industry grew 
rapidly. So rapidly that it gave rise to congestion and safety concerns, particularly in 
London and this led the Government to act. Acting as a result of safety concerns appears to 
mark the UK Government as different from its European neighbours where concern over 
railway and bus competition appears to have been the spur for the control of the bus 
industry. 
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In private ownership, the railways had their shareholders to satisfy. This led them to 
seek powers to buy into the bus companies and this was achieved towards the end of the 
1920s decade. Alongside this, the Government appointed a Royal Commission to consider 
the ‘transport problem’. Their suggestions for the control of buses enshrined the 
recommendations of the earlier Committee set up to resolve safety. The implementation of 
these proposals was enacted by the 1930 Road Traffic Act and the first years of operation 
of this Act led to significant changes in industrial structure. In the name of making the 
industry less chaotic, it was changed from being dominated by the small operator to 
domination by the large and a great amount of conformity in the name of co-ordination. 
World War II brought an increased demand for mobility and this was met by both 
the railways and the motor bus. The post-war Government, as after World War I, was faced 
with a railway crisis resulting from the use of the railways during wartime. However, this 
Government, the newly elected Labour Government, had a well formulated policy for the 
nationalisation of all transport activities to meet the aim of co-ordinated and integrated 
transport The policy of nationalisation as a way of resolving perceived inefficiencies 
resulting from modes competing was articulated from the beginning of the 1930s by a 
number of politicians, in particular Herbert Morrison who held the post-war Transport 
portfolio, and implemented following a commitment of the Labour Party election manifesto 
of 1945, in the Transport Act 1947. Unfortunately the implementation was frustrated by a 
lack of clear direction and organisational contradictions. 
This paper begins by looking at railway policy at the time the bus industry was 
beginning to develop and at the early development of the motor bus. The next section 
considers the origins of regulatory control for the motor bus before turning to how this 
regulation changed the industrial structure of the bus industry prior to World War II. Post-
war nationalisation is then examined before commenting on the nature of co-ordination 
issues between the railways and buses in the early twentieth century context and the 
implications for modern transport policy. 
The paper is based on a number of primary sources (records from the public record 
office (PRO) in the UK, released under the 50 year rule and company repositories) and 
secondary sources. The main contribution of the evidence provided by the primary sources 
is the re-interpretation of the motivation for the regulation of the road passenger industry in 
1930. The idea that this emerged first from interest in the safety record of the sector is new 
and puts the UK at variance with what is known about the development of road passenger 
transport in the near neighbours of Europe. Overall, the motivation of the paper is to try and 
understand the meaning of integration and co-ordination within the context of 
contemporaneous policy and to identify what can be learnt by today’s policy-makers.  
The paper identifies as a critical point that, despite all the legislation being framed 
as intentioned on integration or co-ordination, these terms were not defined or not well 
defined. UK policy was always clouded by the discussion of ownership and the role that 
this played in the ability to ‘co-ordinate’ or ‘integrate’. Moreover, the evidence points to 
UK policy being one of ‘fire-fighting’ or only having action when urgent.  
 
 
Pre-World War I Railways 
 
The railways were of course well established by the time of the outbreak of World War I. In 
the UK, in common with other countries, the railway system was built by private 
companies, both large and small. This diverse set of owners was in competition often, 
particularly in areas where spatially their lines were close together.  
Whilst the railways were privately owned, they were under significant public 
control for safety and also for the charges or ‘rates’ that they could make. Up until 1913, 
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maximum rates were fixed for freight under the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1888 and 
subsequent Orders under that Act: these specified maximum rates for classes of goods. In 
1913, as a result of rising labour costs, a new Act (the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 
1913) allowed many of these rates to rise. For passengers, the initial legislation which 
allowed the railway to be built (either inaugurating or special Acts of Parliament) governed 
the fares that could be charged. The Parliamentary trains legislation (Railway Regulation 
Act, 1844) established the provision of third class coaches (with the right to take significant 
luggage) to facilitate travel in search of work. The Cheap Trains Act of 1883, which 
exempted the duty for any train charging less than a 1d per mile fare, required the railway 
companies to operate a larger number of these trains, this marked the beginning of the 
worker’s train. The main motivation for this latter legislation was the political drive to 
reduce overcrowding in major cities by encouraging workers to move to new housing 
developments outside but this of course needed cheap transport back into the city for work. 
Whilst this Act was entitled the Cheap Trains Act, 1d per mile would have been still 
beyond the means of most of the workers of the time. 
During the war, the railways were operated by the Government’s Railway Executive 
Committee (REC). This was set up in 1912 with war-time control in mind and consisted of 
the general managers of the various larger main line companies, using legislation that had 
long been on the statutes (Regulation of the Forces Act, 1871), in recognition of the 
strategic necessity to control the lines of communication. The railways retained their private 
ownership; day to day management was through the REC. This left the services of the 
railway network at the Government’s disposal for which compensation was paid to the 
railway owners. At the end of the war, the railways were in poor shape – there was a 
shortage of rolling stock and the intensity of use of the system meant that much routine 
maintenance had not taken place, particularly as many of the railway workers had been lost 
to the armed forces for the duration. There was much discussion about how the handover 
from the Government should take place and there was support, according to Aldcroft1 for 
some sort of reorganisation of the railway companies so that there were fewer companies 
overall. From the Government’s point of view, the need for reorganisation became pressing 
as it was still underwriting the railway companies’ revenues. By 1919 it became clear that 
the railways were also now in financial difficulties with their costs rapidly increasing from 
rising wage rates but with fares still controlled. There had been some debate too as to 
whether reorganisation would also include change of ownership but commentators have 
claimed that the Government was not ready for this.2 By 1920, a White Paper published by 
the Government (Outline of Proposals as to the Future Organisation of Transport 
Undertakings in Great Britain and their Relation to the State) proposed reorganisation into 
seven companies. By the time the Act that brought this reorganisation into being (the 
Railways Act, 1921) the number of companies were reduced to four large, geographically 
based units, dubbed ‘The Big Four of the New Railway Era’ by the popular press. Whilst 
the legislation was complex, the Grouping (as it became called) was implemented rapidly 
with the new organisation being in place in January 1923.  
In summary therefore, the railways emerged from World War I with a run-down 
rolling stock and a system which had suffered from lack of investment and lack of 
maintenance and repair work. Much consideration was given to the future of the then 
privately owned railways, and the possibility of nationalisation was contemplated and 
rejected. Post-war wages and the costs in the rail industry were considerably higher than 
pre-war levels and yet their regulated rates had not been changed. The outcome was private 
ownership with a significant degree of regulatory control on rates as well as other aspects of 
the business, such as safety. 
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The Early Days of Motorised Buses  
 
Whilst business and Government concern was focussed on the continued regulation of the 
railways, the bus industry was born and came very much to life. Pioneer motor vehicles did 
exist before 1914, but they came to prominence after the war when vehicles had become 
much more reliable and their mass production had commenced.  
Road vehicles which carried passengers for fares could be subjected to the Town 
Police Clauses Acts of 1847 and 1889. Whilst the former was exclusively concerned with 
hackney carriages (or taxis, as now known), the latter extended the provisions to the 
additional problems presented by omnibuses (or buses, as now known) although these were, 
of course, non-motorised. These Acts allowed local authorities (town councils, urban 
district councils and any rural district council) to licence the vehicle if they had successfully 
obtained an Order from the Minister of Health. But it should be clear that this legislation 
was enabling and originally designed for horse transport and there was no statutory duty to 
implement it. Moreover, the form of licence was simply on the vehicle itself: if the powers 
were used and a vehicle was licensed, this gave it the right to ply for hire anywhere in that 
district without restriction as to time, place or fare. 
The advent of the internal combustion engine created undoubtedly the most 
revolutionary development in the whole field of transport in the first half of the twentieth 
century.3 Over the period 1904-14, motor cars had increased by 1460 per cent and motor 
hackneys (including both buses and taxis) had increased by 857 per cent.4 Figures for cars 
and buses in use show that the initial growth in motorisation was manifested in the growth 
of the motor car and was followed by the growth in motor passenger carrying vehicles 
which accelerated after 1920.5 These show the dramatic growth in private motor cars was 
only halted by the World War II. In the UK, it was London which pioneered the motor bus: 
in 1905, the London General, together with other horse bus operators, decided to 
experiment with motor buses. This led to a rapid progression from horse to motor power so 
that by 1914, the Metropolitan Police records show that the 3551 horse buses in existence 
in 1904 had been replaced by 3057 motor buses.6 
Development outside London was slower but by 1914, before the World War I 
checked further expansion, many of the public transport services were using motorised 
vehicles. After World War I, various factors combined to provide an acceleration in 
numbers. First, large numbers of men had become skilled in both servicing and driving 
motor vehicles in the war. Second, large numbers of ex-servicemen had gratuities to spend 
on the glut of lorries which flooded the market at the end of the war effort. Perhaps most 
importantly on the supply side was the way in which the war period had seen a dramatic 
improvement in the technical performance of these vehicles.  
But supply changes by themselves would not have been enough. The war also 
affected the UK’s population’s aspirations for mobility and had led to a stimulation of 
demand. This was true both for local services – services providing transport within urban 
areas – as well as journeys over longer distances – both the ‘express’ type service and the 
extension of the ‘excursion and tour’ market. This is reflected in the huge growth in the 
private sector provision of motorised passenger carrying vehicles.  
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Figure 1: Early advert from Ward and Lock’s Almanac 
 
Source: Advert from Ward and Lock’s Bournemouth, 1921 
 
The excursions and tours market is a special case which is not well documented. 
Prior to the regulation put in place in 1930, there are no official statistics relating to 
excursions and tours and much of the information is anecdotal. However, many of the new 
operators of charabancs found a niche in this market and extended the ideas formerly 
undertaken by horse-drawn coaches. Excursions or day trips had been made, prior to the 
advent of the motor vehicle, by horse-drawn coaches or charabancs to the Lake District 
(Cowperthwaite’s, Taylor’s and Irwins’s) as early as 1905.7 Railway trips to holiday 
destinations are well documented from the early 1900s. An early Ward Lock Guide (1901) 
to Lyme Regis and South Dorset claimed one of the areas virtues was that it was ‘never 
inundated with train loads of noisy trippers’ being six miles from the nearest railway 
station. Indeed, the railways promoted such activities with much advertising as discussed 
by Harrington.8 Evidence of trips by motor coach is rarer but advertisements in Ward Lock 
Guides published in the early 1920s show clearly that charabancs were well established in 
popular holiday resorts and were providing whole-day and half-day excursions to local 
places of interest. An example is shown in Figure 1, taken from Ward and Lock’s 
Bournemouth, 1921. Birch Brothers appear to have been among the first to offer coach 
tours extending over a period of several days in the 1920s. Other operators active in this 
field included Wallace Arnold Tours and Smith’s of Wigan.  
Given the nature of the journey, it is likely that the railways perceived the 
competition from these excursions and tours earlier than the popular view reported in both 
contemporary and modern literature. With the exception of London, where rail-based 
underground facilities provided journeys which mirrored their motorised bus counterparts, 
journeys by rail could not compete with the motorised buses which had both flexibility of 
route and the ability to stop potentially much closer to the origin and final destination of the 
passenger. 
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The early 1920s therefore saw the first tension between the two modes of transport. 
On the one hand the motorised bus was achieving success in local markets in which the 
railways found difficulty in competing and, on the other, was developing the longer 
distance excursions and tours, almost completely untouched by public intervention. In 
contrast, the railways were heavily regulated. 
 
 
The Origins of Motor Bus Regulation 
 
Concomitant with the fast growth of motor traffic was an increase in the number of fatal 
and non-fatal motor accidents. The growth of motor traffic, particularly in London, 
provoked the first official investigation into the potential regulation of all vehicles, 
including motorbuses. The advisory Committee on London Traffic, set up in 1920, was 
convened to discuss the growing congestion. Concern for public safety was soon thereafter 
voiced with this lobby claiming that the growing number of vehicles on the streets – 
especially in the capital – not only caused congestion but also an increasing level of 
accidents. The motorbus was particularly criticised as dangerous to the public.9 Some of the 
lobby cited the ‘pirates’ as a significant problem: these were the operators, particularly in 
London, who operated where demand was strongest and without any recourse to a timetable 
and would change direction completely if more passengers looked likely to be going the 
other way. It was, however, difficult to regulate motor traffic because the only available 
laws were then designed to control the much slower moving horse drawn transport of the 
nineteenth century as discussed above. As a result, the newer problem of motorised traffic 
was referred in the first instance to the Taxation Committee of the Roads Department 
within the Ministry of Transport. But early in 1922, the specific issues of motorbus taxation 
and regulation were sent on to a newly created Committee, the Hackney Vehicle 
Committee, which had greater local authority representation.  
The creation of this new Committee does not appear to have been politically 
motivated – indeed it was set up under Lloyd George’s Liberal Government but worked 
under the Conservative Government of Bonar Law. Its first meeting in July 1922 was 
dominated by a discussion of safety matters. Nor does this Committee appear to have had 
restrictive regulation as part of its remit as this was not in keeping with either the Liberal or 
Conservative Government’s policy of the day and would have taken considerable 
justification, as had been necessary with the railways.10 Successive Governments of the 
1920s acknowledged the need for motorbus regulation but parliamentary time was fully 
occupied with other measures considered to be of higher priority. Only the London Traffic 
Act of 1924 was passed and this relied very heavily on the evidence and interim 
recommendations of the Hackney Vehicle Committee for its systematic regulation of 
London’s buses. The passage of this Act and the unique nature of London make the capital 
a special case which is not the primary focus of this paper. 
Throughout the 1920s, both the tramway and the railway companies increasingly 
suffered from the competition of motor vehicles. Tramway receipts fell by just over 21 per 
cent in the decade and railway revenues dropped by 17 per cent between 1923 and 1930. 
However, of these two modes, it was the financial position of the railway companies which 
appeared to be of greater concern since investing in railway capital had been a favoured 
form of railway investment. In contrast, by 1920, the majority of tramways were owned by 
local authorities.11  
It was not until there was renewed political and public pressure in 1927, in the form 
of private bills before Parliament to allow railways to obtain powers to own operate or take 
financial interest in passenger-carrying motor transport (finally granted in August 1928) 
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that the Government acted to appoint a Royal Commission on Transport to examine the 
whole ‘transport problem’. The terms of reference were: 
 
To take into consideration the problems arising out of the growth of road traffic 
and with a view to securing the employment of the available means of transport 
in Great Britain (including transport by sea coastwise and by ferries) to the 
greatest public advantage, to consider and report what measures, if any, should 
be adopted for their better regulation and control and, so far as is desirable in 
the public interest, to promote their co-ordinated working and development.12 
 
It is in the evidence before this Royal Commission that the issue of wasteful 
competition between transport modes emerged and has subsequently remained the popular 
interpretation of ensuing legislation. This Commission provided a forum for many 
arguments to be aired, although these were only from the organised pressure groups and 
which has been suggested might have meant that the unanimity of opinion in favour of 
legislative restrictions was overstated.13 The most interesting arguments were those which 
sought regulation to protect the railways and trams and was justified by reference to the 
claim that motor vehicles did not ‘pay their way’ and that this, and the lack of restrictions, 
gave rise to unfair competition. 
The Royal Commission made a number of reports, and the second interim report 
dealt with the issues of the regulation of motor passenger carrying vehicles which gave the 
framework to the 1930 Road Traffic Act. With the exception of how the regulation should 
be administered, discussed in the next section, the Royal Commission did not add much to 
the regulatory recommendations of the Committee whose origins had been based on 
investigating ways of improving safety.14  
After presenting their second report, the Royal Commission went on to consider the 
question of co-ordination. The private Acts of 1928 which had enabled the railway 
companies to buy into bus companies had become operational before the second interim 
report had been published. It is clear that the Royal Commission was to give consideration 
to co-ordination, according to its terms of reference, and that it regarded these powers as 
promoting considerable co-ordination between road and rail through the acquisition by 
railways of substantial interests in bus operations. However, only one piece of evidence 
before the Royal Commission, presented by the President of the LMS railway, Sir Josiah 
Stamp, suggested that the railways desire to acquire bus operations was motivated by the 
opportunity to co-ordinate services and that this was in conjunction with providing a better 
return for shareholders. It is likely that his view was influenced by the great profits that had 
been realised by the Underground group in London when it had merged with the London 
General Omnibus Company in 1912. All subsequent evidence before the Royal 
Commission suggested that the railway companies’ main interest was to maximise the bus 
companies’ profits and so to increase income from this source rather than to promote or 
enhance co-ordination (a might be expected from companies in private ownership with 
shareholders to satisfy).  
The final report of the Royal Commission – the one devoted to co-ordination – 
recognised the different roles that road and rail transport could offer and concluded that the 
aim should be to harmonise and co-ordinate the newer and older forms of transport with the 
objective of obtaining from each the maximum of advantage to the public.15 Whilst the 
members of the Commission managed to produce a unanimous Final report, its members 
were divided on the issue of ownership: this led to comments about ‘unification’ and a 
stated belief that co-ordination would develop naturally through the play of economic 
forces and that such co-ordination would be better than any co-ordination enforced by the 
creation of a huge monopoly [by nationalisation], even if subject to Government control.  
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The 1930s: Regulation and ‘Stabilisation’ of the  
Motor Bus Sector 
 
The second interim Report from the Royal Commission formed the basis of the Road 
Traffic Bill that eventually became the Road Traffic Act 1930. But in respect to 
motorbuses, the Royal Commission did not add any significant evidence to the 
deliberations of the Hackney Vehicle Committee. By the time the Royal Commission had 
reported, the London Traffic Act of 1924 had been in place for some time. The measures 
introduced in this Act had come from the deliberations of the Hackney Vehicle Committee 
(see previous section) and the only significantly different recommendation from the Royal 
Commission was to suggest much larger administrative areas for the rest of the country 
outside London as opposed to vesting responsibility in the control of the local authority. 
The Road Traffic Bill was presented to Parliament by Herbert Morrison in 1929, as 
Minister of Transport in the Labour Government, against the background of the Wall Street 
crash in the USA and a growing economic crisis. As a minority Government, Labour was 
only able to introduce measures which had the support of the Liberals who held the balance 
of power.  
The 1930 Road Traffic Act divided the country into thirteen Traffic Areas: eleven in 
England and Wales (ten after 1933) and two in Scotland. In each of these Traffic Areas, the 
licensing system was administered by the Traffic Commissioners. As an independent 
tribunal, the Traffic Commissioners had a Chairman, directly appointed by the Minister of 
Transport, and two other Commissioners who were part-time; selected from a panels 
nominated by local authorities. The 1930 Act, empowered the Traffic Commissioners to 
control entry and participation in the road passenger carrying industry by licensing the 
vehicles, services and service employees.  
Before a service could be operated, four separate licences needed to be obtained. 
The ‘Certificate of Fitness’ which related to the state of the vehicle, subject to its owner 
being a ‘fit person’; the service personnel (both the driver and conductor (if used)) required 
licences, a public service licence was required for each vehicle and finally a road service 
licence was required for each operation of the vehicle for which passengers were carried at 
separate fares. Services on which separate fares were charged fell into two classes, so far as 
licensing was concerned: stage carriage and express services. A minimum fare was used to 
distinguish between these categories. Excursions and tours were normally recognised as a 
special type of express service (although the law made no such distinction) and the Act 
distinguished them from contract carriages where passengers did not pay separate fares, 
such as a private party on a special outing. 
Very few commentators at the time or since disagreed with the public service 
licence or that drivers and conductors hold a licence guaranteeing their fitness as transport 
workers. Such rules enhanced the bus service and provided for its safety. The road service 
licence, however, was contentious. It authorised bus services and laid down the conditions 
under which companies operated. When granting or refusing this licence commissioners 
considered the suitability of the route and the extent to which it was already served, how far 
the proposed service was necessary or desirable in the public interest, the needs of the area 
as a whole in relation to other traffic and the prospects for co-ordination of transport 
facilities within that area. Even when successful the licensee had to make sure that fares 
were reasonable, were at a level that prevented any ‘wasteful’ competition with other forms 
of transport, that fares and timetables were available and that there were fixed pick-up and 
drop-off points. 
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Although the criteria for granting a licence and the conditions attached to the road 
service licence were embodied in the 1930 Road Traffic Act, both the Traffic 
Commissioners and the Minister of Transport refused to identify any general criteria as to 
when a licence should be granted or rejected. Thus the first five years of the Act’s operation 
provided a diverse experience for motorbus operators and significantly shaped the 
development of the industry because the Traffic Commissioners took relatively independent 
approaches, failed to use precedence in the granting of licences and had vague and at times 
inconsistent definitions of central terms like ‘suitability’ ‘necessary’, ‘desirable’ adequate 
service’ or ‘wasteful competition’. However, all Traffic Commissioners showed a common 
concern to achieve order and uniformity in what had previously been seen as a ‘chaotic’ 
industry. In contrast, the second five years of the decade, showed much greater consistency 
between the Traffic Commissioners’ decisions. Indeed, it might even be argued that the 
granting of all licenses had by then become more or less standardised and had introduced 
inertia into what had been a highly competitive and flexible industry.  
In terms of industrial structure, the decade saw increasing concentration of the 
businesses in the hands of large operators and the virtual demise of the small operator in 
terms of absolute numbers, although many still remained important on the boundaries of the 
larger operators.16 The granting of road service licences was guided by an overriding 
concern for the co-ordination of services and thus the Traffic Commissioners often 
favoured the large operators and showed a willingness to impose levels of service quite 
different from those that had emerged under competition. Uniformity was also sought in the 
setting of fares and the protection of competing modes was considered a necessary but 
troublesome objective.17 The 1930 Road Traffic Act also condoned the practice of cross-
subsidisation of services by requiring the Traffic Commissioners to take account of the 
operation of ‘un-remunerative services’ by the applicant of a road service licence thus 
destroying the ‘free marketplace’ where services which were profitable were run and those 
which were not, were not. Furthermore, the preference given to existing operators in terms 
of perceived co-ordination benefits meant that new entry into the industry became 
increasingly difficult. 
The Road Traffic Act 1930 was thus a restrictive measure that led to the demise of 
the small operator and the emergence of spatial monopolies which were not in the 
philosophy of the Labour Government which favoured nationalisation: this reaffirms safety 
as being of the prime concern in the origins of this legislation. 
 
 
Post-War Nationalisation and De-Nationalisation 
 
The ‘transport problem’ in the 1940s was dominated by the plight of the railways which 
had been over-used and under-invested during World War II. This is in contrast to the more 
buoyant nature of the bus industry where the number of vehicles in use had grown by 22 
per cent between 1937 and 1947 and demand for local journeys was still growing.  
The railways were at the heart of the ‘transport problem’ resulting from a serious 
deterioration in railway assets through their intensive use in the wartime years which had 
not been rectified by modernisation because of the limited funds of the railway owners. 
Although current historiography suggests that the railway’s plight would have been serious, 
without the intervention of hostilities, the legacy of the wartime years clearly exacerbated 
the underlying structural problems arising from lack of investment in new and available 
technologies18 and made the railways the focus of the ‘transport problem’. For the railways, 
the issue of nationalisation in 1945 was a ‘dead issue’ as some form of public ownership or 
control was inevitable whatever the political complexion of the party in power.19 The 
Labour party was committed to a programme of nationalisation of all transport assets and 
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the Conservatives had created public corporations before the war and had made plans for a 
‘prototype’ nationalisation of the railways which was interrupted by the start of hostilities. 
The difference between the political parties was not therefore the bringing of the railways 
into state ownership but the question of whether it was only the railways or transport 
activities more widely. 
The Labour Government achieved a large parliamentary majority in the 1945 
election which made it possible to implement its nationalisation proposals for transport 
which were embodied in the Transport Act 1947. This was the response to the ‘transport 
problem’ and the culmination of a well debated philosophy elaborated throughout the 
1930s. The essence of this philosophy, as argued by Herbert Morrison,20 was that the 
existence of competition between rival private rail and road companies (for both passengers 
and freight) gave rise to inefficiencies that could not be solved by other than single 
ownership. He recognised that a commitment to single ownership meant giving rise to a 
monopoly and, as private monopolies could not be trusted to pursue the public interest and 
would require significant resources by a Government which wanted them to serve the 
public good, a public monopoly was the solution. It was also claimed that the public 
monopoly would give greater efficiency in management (although this is not borne out by 
more recent evidence). A second strand to the debate was that a unified, comprehensive 
transport system would concern itself primarily with determining the most economical and 
efficient method of meeting a particular need – in short nationalisation should be organised 
functionally (by traffic type) and would lead to consolidation and co-ordination. It was 
clear from this debate that a nationalised business was considered to be a sound business 
proposition and should be run as a business (ie not by the Government) and that this would 
lead to efficiency gains through co-ordination and integration, increases in the quality of 
service simultaneously with cost savings following unification, the provision of socially 
desirable but unprofitably services and improvements for the labour force. Thus post-war, 
whilst the ‘transport problem’ was dominated by the state of the railways and there was 
perhaps an expectation that nationalisation for the railways was inevitable; the underlying 
philosophy demanded that the nationalisation of all transport assets was necessary to 
achieve maximum efficiency.  
The Transport Act, 1947 set up the British Transport Commission (BTC) as the 
executive body having the general duty ‘to provide an efficient, adequate, economical and 
properly integrated system of public inland transport and facilities’.21 The BTC acted as a 
non-executive, planning authority with the day to day management of the BTC’s assets 
delegated to newly formed Executives who were the agents of the BTC and were organised 
on a modal basis. This complicated framework was to ensure that the process of state 
ownership created a ‘business’ which was accountable to Parliament but not run by 
Government.  
The 1947 Act was primarily concerned with the nationalisation of the railways, 
inland waterways, docks and road haulage. The road passenger activities outside London 
were not automatically nationalised under the Act although provision was made for the 
BTC to purchase in this sector. This was largely for practical reasons as the road sector 
consisted of a large number of operators, unlike the four main railway companies, each of 
whom would need to be separately negotiated with. Nevertheless, when the former private 
railway companies were vested in the BTC, the BTC acquired a substantial interest in bus 
undertakings in the form of the railways’ shareholdings in bus companies. Also, the BTC 
acquired substantial passenger transport interests, including trolleybus undertakings, as a 
result of the separate nationalisation of electricity as well as making a separate purchase of 
Thomas Tilling, one of the bigger companies operating in England and Wales, and the 
Scottish Motor Traction Company. 
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However, whilst the Act was founded on a well debated philosophy, it gave few 
guidelines to how the benefits of co-ordination and integration were to be achieved. 
Financially, the BTC was expected to pay its way ‘taking one year with another’ suggesting 
that there would be a balance of surpluses and deficits and this would be in line with the 
servicing of the fixed interest stock which paid for the acquisitions. In terms of charging, 
the BTC was expected to provide what was demanded at the cheapest possible price, but 
again with no advice.  
In terms of public control of road passenger transport, the 1947 Act was almost 
silent. The BTC was only required to examine the road passenger transport operations 
outside London and to prepare Area Schemes for the co-ordination of all passenger 
transport services. In practice, road passenger transport was the responsibility of the Roads 
Executive and they were preoccupied with the pressing need to deal with the set priority of 
the acquisition of road haulage operations. More than a year passed before much progress 
was made on the preparation of an Area Scheme to promote ‘co-ordination’ of road 
passenger services (and even then, reference to road/rail co-ordination was not made). The 
first Area Scheme was running into difficulties with the local authorities and bus operators 
who were making significant opposition (particularly since all those in favour had already 
sold out to the BTC). Shortly after, another election in 1950 returned the Labour 
Government but with a much reduced majority and this limited the ability of the BTC, 
through its Executives, to push ahead with unpopular proposals. The following year, in 
1951, a Conservative Government was successfully elected and all aspects of BTC activity 
was terminated. There is no doubt that, if implemented, the Area Schemes for road 
passenger transport would have created the biggest move towards integration/co-ordination 
under the 1947 Act. With the evidence of the intervening years from the Passenger 
Transport Areas created under the 1968 Transport Act in the UK and from European 
experience more widely, the creation of regional authorities do have a significant impact on 
the delivery of integrated and co-ordinated public transport. 
The outcome of the 1947 Transport Act was to change the structure of ownership in 
the transport sector. Railways were nationalised, although this was primarily to ameliorate 
the problems created by their use during World War II and the lack of available finance by 
private owners to provide for necessary modernisation. The road passenger transport 
industrial structure was also different: a significant proportion of road passenger transport 
was now in public ownership (if only by accident). But the public control which organised 
how these vehicles were to operate had not been changed and indeed did not change with 
any significance until the deregulation of express services in 1980 and the privatisation and 
deregulation of all local services in 1985.  
 
 
Co-ordination: A Commentary 
 
The idea of co-ordinated or integrated transport has been used as the justification for all the 
legislation discussed in this paper. Unlike many of its European neighbours who decided 
early on to bring public transport into state ownership, UK transport issues have been 
characterised by considerations of ownership perhaps more than identifying how it should 
work. 
Another characteristic of UK policy would appear to be that Governments only 
acted when under pressure. The aftermath of World War I brought urgency in dealing with 
the railways. The more chaotic nature of London traffic led to the Hackney Vehicle 
Committee recommendations being put in place for London with the London Traffic Act. 
Post World War II it was again the railways that prompted urgent action. Associated with 
this ‘fire-fighting’ tendency, Government’s have suffered inertia when there is a lack of 
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urgency. It could be argued that the post World War II road passenger transport industry 
was doing well – it was contributing positively to the profits of the BTC – whereas road 
haulage issues were an urgent preoccupation of the Executive responsible for road transport 
under the BTC because of its interaction with the railways, the public commitment to 
nationalisation of road haulage and issues surrounding road and rail freight competition. 
Thus action on the road passenger industry did not happen.  
One puzzling element of the 1947 Transport Act and its attempt to secure co-
ordination and integration relates to the conflict between its underlying philosophy and its 
implementation. The underlying philosophy was that a unified, comprehensive transport 
system would concern itself primarily with determining the most economical and efficient 
method of meeting a particular need and this is why all modes of transport should be under 
the responsibility of a single body. It also suggests that the single body should be organised 
functionally so that passenger transport, freight transport and so on can be provided by the 
most efficient mode. In this respect, the 1947 Transport Act was almost doomed to failure 
in its attempt to provide co-ordinated and integrated transport by organising the day to day 
responsibilities on a modal basis. Although this organisation was carried over from the first 
introduction of a Ministry of Transport in 1919, there was no requirement to maintain this 
structure. In the UK it is a lesson only learnt recently, following the Eddington Transport 
Study22 that better policy for passenger and freight traffic comes from a functional 
organisation of the Ministry and the UK Ministry has been thus reorganised in 2007.  
Whilst ‘integration’ and ‘co-ordination’ have been the corner-stone of the 
development of public policy, it was at no time carefully specified as to what this meant. 
Whilst the Royal Commission did have a view about co-ordination and believed in 
particular that railways buying road passenger operating companies would enhance co-
ordination, it did not explain how its recommendations would enhance this concept. In 
relation to the implementation of the 1930 Road Traffic Act, co-ordination was associated 
with creating a ‘tidy’ and well ordered sector. In the case of the Area Schemes under the 
1947 Transport Act, co-ordination was identified as removing the restrictive practices of 
adjoining operators and operations. But neither of these required the form of legislation that 
was employed. Similarly, ‘integration’ was not well defined by the Labour Government in 
its post-war development on policy and it could have taken a number of forms: traffic could 
have been diverted to the most suitable mode either by ‘directive’ or by adopting a charges 
policy which favoured a mode for a particular traffic. 
Perhaps the biggest contribution to the failure to achieve the co-ordination and 
integration implied by legislation was a lack of recognition as to the role of pricing. In the 
implementation of the 1930 Road Traffic Act, the Traffic Commissioners were deliberately 
invited to promote cross subsidy between routes as a way of extending the spatial network 
by the continuation of routes that were otherwise ‘unremunerative’. In addition, whilst 
outside their remit, they moved to a system of setting standard fares showing they failed to 
recognise that operators with lower costs could offer a lower fare.23 Perhaps this was 
understandable given the nature of knowledge about the role of pricing in the early 1930s. 
But by the end of the 1930s decade, the role of price as a signal was well developed yet 
ignored by the legislation and in particular the role of marginal cost pricing as a way of 
utilising infrastructure. As identified earlier, the BTC was required to generally break even 
and to provide what was demanded at the cheapest possible price without direction as to 
how this should be done. The lack of explicit direction, the statutory financial requirement 
to break even and the need not to discriminate unfairly (interpreted as charging the same 
rate for the same distance, irrespective of mode) led to a systematic drift towards average 
pricing and thus to cross subsidy. Indeed, that this was not understood became clear in the 
BTC’s first attempt at setting rates which equalised those of road and rail for freight 
without recognising the different cost base of each mode.  
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Conclusions 
 
The developments in the UK were thus characterised by a stronger discussion of the nature 
of the ownership and its impact on delivering co-ordination and integration than its 
European neighbours. This was linked to the ‘crisis management’ approach of successive 
Governments in relation to preserving the popular investment of the railway for the public. 
Had the railways been brought into state ownership in the 1920s, a debate as to how to 
define and achieve co-ordination and integration might have occurred. 
A review of the historical evidence suggests a number of missed opportunities, 
particularly in relation to the outcome of the 1947 Transport Act. Had the design of the 
legislation been more aligned to the intellectual debate of the 1930s, the policy of the 
Labour Government may well have been realised. Instead it required a further twenty years 
to pass before the realisation that co-ordination and integration were features of aligning 
functions and fares rather than a requirement to hold all assets in the public sector. 
 
Corinne Mulley, Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies, Faculty of Economics and 
Business, The University of Sydney, Australia. <c.mulley@itls.usyd.edu.au> 
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